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Asset Bubbles and Credit Constraints†
By Jianjun Miao and Pengfei Wang*
We provide a theory of rational stock price bubbles in production 
economies with infinitely-lived agents. Firms meet stochastic invest-
ment opportunities and face endogenous credit constraints. They are 
not fully committed to repaying debt. Credit constraints are derived 
from incentive constraints in optimal contracts which ensure default 
never occurs in equilibrium. Stock price bubbles can emerge through 
a positive feedback loop mechanism and cannot be ruled out by 
transversality conditions. These bubbles command a liquidity pre-
mium and raise investment by raising the debt limit. Their collapse 
leads to a recession and a stock market crash. (JEL D25, E22, E32, 
E44, G12, G14)
This paper provides a novel theory of rational stock price bubbles in the presence 
of endogenous credit constraints.1 Our theory is motivated by two observations. 
First, fluctuations in observable fundamentals cannot adequately explain stock mar-
ket booms and busts (Shiller 2016). Second, stock market booms are often accom-
panied by credit market booms. For example, overoptimism in the 1990s toward an 
“East Asian miracle” generated booms in the housing and stock markets in many 
East Asian countries followed by lending booms and a large expansion of domestic 
credit (Collyns and Senhadji 2002). Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2015) document 
empirical evidence on the relation between credit booms and asset price booms in 
17 developed countries since 1870. They find that leveraged bubbles are more harm-
ful to the macroeconomy than other types of bubbles, e.g., unleveraged “irrational 
exuberance” bubbles.
1 A stock price bubble is defined as the difference between a stock’s market value and its fundamental value, 
e.g., the discounted value of exogenously given dividends in exchange economies (Santos and Woodford 1997). It 
is subtle to apply this definition to our model because dividends are endogenously generated through investment and 
production and because bubbles help generate dividends. One criticism of the standard test for stock price bubbles 
is that it is hard to separate them from fundamentals in the data (see Gürkaynak 2008 for a survey). A pure bubble 
is defined as the bubble in an intrinsically useless asset without any payoff (e.g., fiat money). This asset does not 
enter utility or technology and its fundamental value is zero. 
* Miao: Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, CICFS, 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, CEMA, Central University of Finance and Economics (email: 
miaoj@bu.edu); Wang: Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water 
Bay, Hong Kong (email: pfwang@ust.hk). This paper was accepted to the AER under the guidance of John Leahy, 
Coeditor. We thank numerous people at many institutions and conferences for helpful feedback. We are especially 
grateful to Klaus Adam, Jess Benhabib, Christophe Chamley, Russell Cooper, Jordi Galí, Simon Gilchrist, Nobu 
Kiyotaki, Tom Sargent, Jean Tirole, Yi Wen, Mike Woodford, Wei Xiong, Tao Zha, and anonymous referees for 
insightful comments and suggestions. Wang acknowledges financial support from the Research Grants Council of 
Hong Kong under Projects 16515216 and 693513. First version: December 2010.
† Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160782 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s).
2591MIAO AND WANG: ASSET BUBBLES AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTSVOL. 108 NO. 9
To formalize our theory, we construct a tractable continuous-time general equilib-
rium model of a production economy with a stock market in which infinitely-lived 
identical households trade firm stocks in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. In 
the baseline model, households are risk neutral and so the rate of return on any 
stock is equal to the constant subjective discount rate.2 A continuum of firms meet 
uninsured idiosyncratic stochastic investment opportunities to transform consump-
tion into a capital good that may then be sold in a market for capital (Kiyotaki and 
Moore 1997, 2005, 2008). Assume that there is a liquidity mismatch (Jermann and 
Quadrini 2012) in the sense that investment must be paid for before capital sales 
can be realized.3 Thus, after exhausting internal funds, investing firms must seek 
external financing.
As a starting point, we assume that investing firms only use intratemporal debt 
borrowed from firms without investment opportunities to finance investment. 
Investing firms take on debt at the beginning of the period and repay this debt at 
the end of the period using the proceeds from the sale of newly produced capital. 
They do not have other sources of financing: i.e., they do not own and trade financial 
assets including the shares of other firms in the stock market, issue new equity, sell 
capital, or save to accumulate wealth. Some of these assumptions reflect the fact 
that equity financing is more costly than debt financing due to direct administration 
and underwriting costs, agency problems, or information asymmetries not explicitly 
modeled in our paper. Another interpretation following Kiyotaki and Moore (2005, 
2008) is that investment opportunities disappear so quickly that firms do not have 
enough time to raise equity or sell a large amount of capital.
The key assumption of our model is that firms face endogenous credit constraints, 
which we model in a similar way to Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Kehoe and Levine 
(1993), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Albuquerque and 
Hopenhayn (2004), and Jermann and Quadrini (2012). The key idea is that bor-
rowers are not fully committed to repaying debt and repayment is not perfectly 
enforced. We consider the following lending contract to ensure borrowers never 
default on their debt in equilibrium. A firm pledges its ownership rights including 
its physical assets (capital) as collateral. If the firm does not repay its debt, then the 
lender threatens to seize the firm’s collateralized assets and take over the firm. Thus, 
the collateral value to the lender is equal to the market value of the firm with the 
collateralized assets. The lender and the firm renegotiate the debt such that the debt 
repayment is limited by this collateral value. For incentive compatibility, the firm 
chooses not to default. The resulting credit constraint is endogenously derived from 
the incentive constraint in an optimal contracting problem.
Unlike Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who assume that the collateral value is equal 
to the liquidation value of the collateralized assets, we derive the collateral value 
from the incentive constraint as the going-concern value of the reorganized firm. 
Since the going-concern value is priced in the stock market, it may contain a bubble 
component. If both the lender and the investing firm optimistically believe that the 
2 In online Appendix D, we show that our key insights also apply to risk-averse households. 
3 We define liquidity as the amount of money that is quickly available for investment. Sometimes we also refer 
to liquidity as the degree to which an asset can be quickly turned into cash. See Kiyotaki and Moore (2005, 2008), 
Farhi and Tirole (2012), and Vayanos and Wang (2012) for related studies of liquidity. 
2592 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2018
collateral value is high possibly because it contains a bubble, the firm will borrow 
more and the lender will not mind lending more because the lender can capture the 
bubble in the event of default. Thus, the firm can finance more investment and make 
higher profits, making its assets indeed more valuable. This positive feedback loop 
mechanism makes the beliefs of both the lender and the borrower self-fulfilling and 
allows a stock price bubble to emerge in equilibrium. We refer to this type of equi-
librium as the bubbly equilibrium.
Our credit constraint is equivalent to that endogenously derived from the incentive 
constraint in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). Suppose 
that there is no collateral for borrowing.4 A firm can default on debt by diverting 
funds. The defaulting firm is shut down and the lender may get nothing in the event 
of default. The incentive constraint in an optimal contract ensures that the value to 
the firm of not defaulting is not lower than the outside value of the diverted funds. A 
stock price bubble can relax the incentive constraint and hence the credit constraint 
by raising the value to the firm of not defaulting. The firm can then borrow more to 
finance more investment, supporting a higher firm value. The aforementioned pos-
itive feedback loop mechanism still works with a slight modification to support the 
stock price bubble.
There is a second type of equilibrium in which no one believes in bubbles and 
hence bubbles do not exist. We call this type the bubbleless equilibrium. We provide 
explicit conditions to determine which type of equilibrium can exist. We prove that 
the economy has two steady states: a bubbly one and a bubbleless one. Both steady 
states are inefficient due to credit constraints and both are local saddle points. The 
equilibrium around the bubbly steady state is unique and bubbles persist in the long 
run along a stable manifold, whereas the equilibrium around the bubbleless steady 
state has indeterminacy of degree 1 and bubbles eventually burst along a stable 
manifold. Thus, multiple equilibria in our model are not generated by indeterminacy 
with a unique steady state as in the literature surveyed by Benhabib and Farmer 
(1999) and Farmer (1999).
Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Weil (1987), we construct a third 
type of equilibrium with stochastic bubbles in which all agents believe that stock 
price bubbles will burst at each date with a positive probability. When bubbles burst, 
they cannot reappear. We show that when all agents believe that the probability of 
bubble bursting is small enough, an equilibrium with stochastic bubbles exists. Once 
bubbles burst, a recession occurs in that there is a credit crunch and consumption 
and output fall eventually. In addition, as soon as bubbles burst, investment falls 
discontinuously and the stock market crashes. All of this happens in the absence of 
any exogenous shock to economic fundamentals.
After presenting and analyzing our baseline model in Sections II through IV, we 
discuss our model assumptions and study the robustness of our results by analyz-
ing various extensions in Section V. We find that a stock price bubble can emerge 
as long as firms use debt financing subject to sufficiently tight credit constraints 
endogenously derived from optimal contracts with limited commitment, when other 
4 In online Appendix C, we show that the self-enforcing contract in which a defaulting firm is punished by being 
excluded from the credit market can also generate a stock price bubble. In this case the lender gets nothing upon 
default. 
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sources of finance are limited. First, we show that the usual Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997) collateral constraint can generate a pure bubble in intrinsically useless assets 
(e.g., money), but cannot generate a stock price bubble. By contrast, a pure bub-
ble and a stock price bubble can coexist under our endogenous credit constraints. 
Second, we allow firms to issue new equity to households or use a fraction of cap-
ital sales to finance investment. We show that our insights do not change as long as 
equity issues or capital sales are sufficiently limited. If they are unlimited, then firms 
would be able to overcome borrowing constraints and achieve the efficient equilib-
rium and no bubble could exist.
Finally, we introduce other types of assets such as intertemporal risk-free bonds 
and assets with exogenous rents (e.g., land). Suppose that firms can trade one of 
these two types of assets to finance investment. We show that the asset with exoge-
nous rents that grow as fast as the economy can coexist with a stock price bubble, as 
long as the asset is less liquid than the stock. Otherwise, this asset will dominate the 
stock price bubble. When intertemporal bonds are available for trade, firms want to 
save in bonds precautionarily because they anticipate that they will meet uninsured 
investment opportunity shocks in the future. These bonds and bubbles are perfect 
substitutes. The equilibrium interest rate is lower than the subjective discount rate 
so that households prefer to short bonds. The spread between the stock return and 
the interest rate reflects the liquidity premium. We introduce market frictions such 
as short-sale constraints on the additional assets (Kocherlakota 1992).5 We also 
assume that no firm trades the equity shares of other firms to finance investment. 
Without these frictions, unlimited arbitrage would cause the economy to achieve the 
efficient equilibrium and no bubble could exist.
I. Basic Intuition and Related Literature
To understand the basic intuition behind our model and our contributions to the 
literature, we begin with the standard asset-pricing equation for equity under risk 
neutrality in a discrete-time deterministic environment
(1)  V t =  D t +  e −r  V t+1 , 
where  V t denotes the cum-dividend stock price,  D t denotes dividends, and  r denotes 
the subjective discount rate. We can write the solution as
  V t =  V t ∗ +  B t ,  V t ∗ =  ∑ 
s=0
∞
  e −rs  D t+s , 
where  V t ∗ represents the fundamental component and  B t ≥ 0 represents the bubble 
component,
(2)  B t =  e −r  B t+1 . 
5 Short-sale constraints are widely adopted in the finance literature (e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong 2003) and can 
be justified by institutional features such as direct transaction costs and default risk associated with short-selling 
or SEC rules. 
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In an infinite-horizon model with infinitely-lived agents, the transversality 
condition
  lim 
T→∞  e −rT  V t+T = 0 
is necessary in equilibrium and rules out bubbles because it implies
  0 =  lim 
T→∞  e −rT  B t+T =  B t . 
The transversality condition can be violated in the overlapping generations (OLG) 
framework with finitely-lived agents. This framework is often used to study bub-
bles (Samuelson 1958; Diamond 1965; Tirole 1985). Giglio, Maggiori, and Stroebel 
(2016) find no evidence of bubbles that violate the transversality condition in the 
UK and Singapore housing markets. Abel et al. (1989) find no evidence of dynamic 
inefficiency, which is the condition for the existence of a bubble in Tirole (1985).
Another issue with the standard asset-pricing equations (1) and (2) is related to 
the steady state. If a stock price bubble can exist in the steady state (i.e.,  B > 0) , 
then (1) and (2) imply that  r = 0 and  D = 0, where a variable without a time sub-
script denotes its steady-state value. There are two implications. First, a necessary 
condition for a bubble to exist is that the growth rate of the bubble must be lower 
than the growth rate of the economy, i.e.,  r ≤ 0 (Tirole 1985; Santos and Woodford 
1997). Otherwise, the bubble would be growing so fast that no one could afford to 
buy into the bubble. Second, in order for a stock price bubble to exist in the steady 
state, the detrended dividend (relative to economic growth) must be equal to 0 in 
that state (Tirole 1985). On the other hand, if the steady-state detrended dividend 
is positive, then a stock price bubble cannot exist. Moreover, no bubble can coexist 
with any infinitely-lived assets with positive (detrended) rents in the steady state. 
This issue is related to the rate of return dominance puzzle in monetary economics.
The main contribution of our paper is to provide a new theory of stock price 
bubbles that can overcome the issues discussed above. According to our theory, the 
asset-pricing equation for the stock price bubble is given by
(3)  B t =  e −r  B t+1 (1 + LI Q t+1 ), 
instead of (2), where  LI Q t+1 represents the liquidity premium. The key is that a 
stock price bubble is attached to productive assets (capital) with endogenous pay-
offs. Our insight is that the stock price bubble has real effects and affects dividends. 
Although asset-pricing equation (1) for equity still holds so that the rate of stock 
return is equal to the subjective discount rate, the growth rate of the stock price 
bubble is lower than this rate due to the liquidity premium or “collateral yield.” The 
collateral yield comes from the fact that the stock price bubble helps relax credit 
constraints and allows firms to make profitable investment, thereby generating more 
dividends. Consequently, the transversality condition cannot rule out the stock price 
bubble, which can emerge and sustain in dynamically efficient economies with pos-
itive dividends.
Our formulation of the positive feedback loop mechanism that generates a 
stock price bubble is novel. This mechanism works through credit constraints 
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 endogenously derived from incentive constraints in optimal contracts with limited 
commitment. The critical feature of such contracts is that equity value enters incen-
tive constraints. A stock price bubble raises debt capacity by relaxing incentive con-
straints and hence raises investment and firm value to support the bubble. We show 
that a stock price bubble can emerge for several forms of contracts whenever incen-
tive constraints have this feature, e.g., the contract in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) 
and Gertler and Karadi (2011) and the self-enforcing contract (Kehoe and Levine 
1993). By contrast, we show that the usual credit constraints used in the literature 
(e.g., the Kiyotaki-Moore collateral constraint) can generate a pure bubble, but not 
a stock price bubble.
Unlike pure bubbles, stock price bubbles are attached to productive firms with pos-
itive dividends and are not separately tradable from firm stocks. Stock price bubbles 
can emerge in different firms or in different sectors, and their emergence or collapse 
may be unrelated to the emergence or collapse of pure bubbles. Fiat money is a pure 
bubble supplied by the government. It serves as a store of value and a medium of 
exchange and has a different nature from stock price bubbles. Thus, one must go 
beyond standard theories of pure bubbles or money to understand stock price bubbles.
We show that firm value consists of a fundamental component and a bubble com-
ponent. Unlike the extant literature, we explicitly characterize the liquidity premium 
provided by the bubble component and link the fundamental component to the Q 
theory of investment (Tobin 1969; Hayashi 1982). As in Hayashi (1982), firms are 
infinitely-lived and make investment decisions that maximize their stock market val-
ues. The presence of a stock price bubble causes average Q to differ from marginal 
Q. Thus, using average Q to measure marginal Q in empirical studies could be mis-
leading. Our framework of infinite-horizon production economies with bubbles can 
be easily extended to incorporate many standard ingredients for both theoretical and 
quantitative analyses of asset prices, business cycles, and economic growth (Miao 
and Wang 2012, 2014, 2015; Miao, Wang, and Xu 2015, 2016; Miao, Wang, and 
Zhou 2015). In particular, Miao, Wang, and Xu (2015) apply Bayesian estimation 
methods to study stock market bubbles and business cycles using our framework.
Some studies (e.g., Scheinkman and Weiss 1986; Kocherlakota 1992, 2008; Santos 
and Woodford 1997; Hellwig and Lorenzoni 2009) have found that infinite-horizon 
models of endowment economies with borrowing constraints can generate rational 
bubbles. Unlike this literature, our paper analyzes a production economy with stock 
price bubbles attached to productive firms.6
Rather than studying stock price bubbles, the extant literature on production econ-
omies typically studies pure bubbles like money that can provide liquidity by raising 
the borrower’s net worth (Woodford 1990; Kiyotaki and Moore 2005, 2008; Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy 2006; Kocherlakota 2009; Farhi and Tirole 2012; Martin and 
Ventura 2012; Wang and Wen 2012; Hirano and Yanagawa 2017). These studies con-
tain the idea that pure bubbles can relax credit constraints and raise investment. Their 
credit constraints are different from ours and they do not incorporate an explicit stock 
market where firms can be valued as in equation (1). Kiyotaki and Moore (2005, 
6 See Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) for a model of bubbles based on heterogeneous beliefs and Adam, Marcet, 
and Nicolini (2016) for an asset-pricing model where agents have subjective beliefs about the pricing function. See 
Brunnermeier (2008) and Miao (2014) for surveys of various theories of bubbles. 
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2008) derive an equation similar to (3) for money and emphasize the importance of 
the liquidity premium for the circulation of money. Martin and Ventura (2012) repli-
cate their baseline OLG model with pure bubbles using stock and credit markets and 
reinterpret their pure bubble as firm value, which has no fundamental component. In 
a related OLG model, Martin and Ventura (2011) assume that an entrepreneur can 
start a new firm in each period and use its future market value, which may contain 
bubble and fundamental components, as collateral to borrow.
Unlike the infinite-horizon models, credit constraints are inessential for the emer-
gence of bubbles in the OLG models because bubbles as pyramid schemes can exist 
without credit constraints (Tirole 1985). Their key role is to allow bubbles to have a 
crowding-in effect and emerge in dynamically efficient OLG economies, instead of 
providing a positive feedback loop mechanism to support a bubble as in our paper 
(Farhi and Tirole 2012; Martin and Ventura 2011, 2012). None of these three papers 
studies asset-pricing equations like (1) and (3) for stocks and bubbles or the related 
rate of return dominance discussed earlier.
Finally, our idea that stock price bubbles can provide liquidity is related to the 
literature on the search theory of money (Kiyotaki and Wright 1989; Lagos and 
Wright 2005; Gu, Mattesini, and Wright 2016).7 This literature emphasizes the role 
of money and other assets in overcoming trading frictions in economies with decen-
tralized trade. Money commands a liquidity premium and satisfies an equation sim-
ilar to (3). This literature does not study stock price bubbles attached to firms with 
endogenous dividends and capital.
II. Baseline Model
We consider an infinite-horizon production economy, consisting of a continuum 
of identical households of a unit measure and a continuum of ex ante identical, but 
ex post heterogeneous firms of a unit measure. Firms are subject to independent 
idiosyncratic shocks and there is no aggregate uncertainty. Time is continuous and 
denoted by  t ≥ 0. For a better understanding of intuition, we sometimes consider 
a discrete-time approximation with time denoted by  t = 0,  Δ,  2Δ,  … . We will 
focus our analysis on the continuous-time limit as  Δ → 0 .
ASSUMPTION 1: There are three asset markets. Households are shareholders of 
all firms and trade firm shares in a stock market without trading frictions. Firms 
buy and sell capital in a market for capital goods and they do not own or trade the 
shares of other firms in the stock market. There is also an intratemporal debt market 
in which firms borrow and lend among themselves.
The key ingredients of our baseline model are the following:
• Endogenous credit constraints derived from optimal contracts with limited 
commitment. The critical feature of this type of contracts is that firm value 
enters incentive constraints. Under a specific contract form, a firm can borrow 
7 Our paper is also related to the literature on commodity money. Unlike stock price bubbles, commodity money 
can serve as a consumption good that directly enters a household’s utility function (e.g., Sargent 2016). 
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against its market value and the lender can seize the stock price bubble in the 
event of default.
• A liquidity mismatch in the sense that capital sales are realized after investment 
spending.
• The inability of firms to raise funds to finance investment by issuing new equity, 
selling capital, or saving to accumulate wealth.
A. Households
The representative household is risk neutral and derives utility from a consump-
tion stream  { C t } according to the utility function  ∑ s=0 ∞  e −rsΔ  C sΔ Δ . Households sup-
ply labor inelastically and aggregate labor supply is normalized to 1. They trade firm 
stocks without any trading frictions. The net supply of each firm’s stocks is normal-
ized to 1. Since households are identical, they do not trade among themselves and 
each household holds one unit of shares in equilibrium.
The representative household faces the budget constraint during period  [t, t + Δ] ,
(4)  C t Δ +  ∫   
 
 ( V t  j −  D t  jΔ)  ψ t+Δ   j dj =  ∫   
 
 V t  j  ψ t   j dj +  w t  N t Δ,  
where  V t  j denotes firm  j ’s expected cum-dividend equity value,  ψ t   j denotes holdings 
of firm  j ’s shares,  D t  j denotes firm  j ’s expected dividends determined by its optimi-
zation problem,  w t denotes the wage rate, and  N t denotes labor supply.8 Since there 
is no aggregate uncertainty, linear utility gives the first-order condition
(5)  V t  j =  D t  jΔ +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ  j , 
for each firm  j. This equation says that the rate of return (or the discount rate) on 
each stock must be equal to  r . Linear utility implies the transversality condition (see, 
e.g., Ekeland and Scheinkman 1986; Acemoglu 2009),
(6)  lim 
T→∞  e −rT  V T   j  ψ T 
  j =  lim 
T→∞  e −rT  V T   j = 0,  
where we have used the market-clearing condition  ψ T   j = 1 for all  T and all  j. 
B. Firms
Each firm  j ∈  [0, 1] is endowed with initial capital  K 0 j > 0 and combines labor 
N t j ≥ 0 and capital  K t j ≥ 0 to produce output at time  t according to the Cobb-
Douglas production function  Y t j =  ( K t j ) α  ( N t j ) 1−α ,  α ∈  (0, 1) . Capital depreciates 
at rate  δ . After solving the static labor choice problem, we obtain the operating 
profits
(7)  R t  K t j =  max  N t j  ( K t 
j) α  ( N t j) 1−α −  w t  N t j , 
8 Households’ optimization problem must also satisfy a no-Ponzi-game condition  lim T→∞  e −rT  ∫   
  V T j  ψ T j  dj ≥ 0 (Acemoglu 2009). We use  z ̇t to denote  d z t /dt for any variable  z t in continuous time. 
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where  w t is the wage rate and  R t is given by
(8)  R t = α (  w t  _ 1 − α) 
 α−1 _α  . 
We will show later that  R t is equal to the marginal product of capital in equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates firm  j ’s sequential decision problem during period  [t, t + Δ] . 
The firm hires labor, produces output, and receives profits  R t  K t jΔ at time  t. It then 
meets an opportunity to invest in capital with Poisson probability  πΔ , as in Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997, 2005, 2008). Investment transforms consumption into capital 
goods one for one, which can be sold in the market for capital. With probability 
1 − πΔ, no investment opportunity arrives. This assumption captures firm-level 
investment lumpiness and generates ex post firm heterogeneity. Assume that the 
arrival of an investment opportunity is independent over time and across firms so 
that a law of large numbers can be applied for aggregation. This means that only a 
fraction  πΔ of firms have investment opportunities during period  [t, t + Δ] .
ASSUMPTION 2: There is no insurance market against having an investment 
opportunity.
When no investment opportunity arrives, firm  j buys (sells) additional capital 
K t+Δ j −  (1 − δΔ)  K t j > (<) 0 in the capital goods market at the price  Q t and pays 
dividends  D 0t j Δ ≥ 0 at the end of period  [t, t + Δ] . When an investment opportu-
nity arrives at time  t after production, firm  j invests  I t j, and then sells its newly pro-
duced capital  I t j and buys (sells) additional capital  K 1t+Δ j −  (1 − δΔ)  K t j > (<) 0 at 
the price  Q t in the capital goods market at the end of period  [t, t + Δ] . Thus, capital 
sales  Q t  I t  j and transactions  Q t [ K 1t+Δ j −  (1 − δΔ)  K t j ] are realized after investment 
spending  I t j. This creates a liquidity mismatch so that firm  j must access external 
funds in addition to its internal funds  R t  K t jΔ to finance investment. There is no 
capital adjustment cost. It is the illiquidity of capital and the associated liquidity 
Figure 1. Timeline for Firm  j ’s Decision Process
Time t
Poisson
shock
No 
defa
ult
Default
Time t + ∆
Profits  Rt Kt ∆j
Invest  It 
j
Borrow  Lt 
j
Contract
Prob 1 − pi∆
Prob pi∆
Sell Qt It
j
Sell Qt It
j
Buy Qt K1t+∆ − (1 − δ∆)Kt j j
Buy Qt Kt+∆ − (1 − δ∆)Kt  j j[ ]
Buy Qt K1t+∆ − (1 − δ∆)Kt  j[ ]j
Repay e−r  ∆Vt+∆ (ξ(1 − δ∆)Kt
Pay dividends D1t
j
Pay dividends D0t ∆j
Pay dividends 
Repay Lt 
j
j
[ ]
)
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mismatch that prevent the use of capital sales to finance investment. Assumption 2 
ensures that resources cannot be transferred when they are needed.
ASSUMPTION 3: The only source of external financing for any firm  j is intratem-
poral loans  L t j. Firms cannot issue new equity, cannot use capital sales for financing 
due to liquidity mismatch, and do not possess any other financial assets.
The credit market for the intratemporal debt is operated among firms. Investing 
firms borrow funds from non-investing firms. The interest rate on the intratemporal 
debt is 0 and its price is 1. After capital sales  Q t  I t j are realized at the end of period [t, t + Δ] , investing firm  j repays intratemporal loans  L t j. It then buys or sells addi-
tional capital  K 1t+Δ j −  (1 − δΔ)  K t j before paying out dividends  D 1t  j ≥ 0. 9 We will 
show that  Q t  I t j >  I t j =  R t  K t jΔ +  L t j (i.e.,  Q t > 1 ) in equilibrium so that firm  j can 
fully repay loans after selling newly produced capital  I t j.
Let the ex ante market value of firm  j prior to the realization of an investment 
opportunity shock be  V t ( K t j), where we suppress aggregate state variables in the 
argument. Assume that management acts in the best interest of shareholders (i.e., 
households) to maximize the market value of the firm (or equity value). It follows 
from (5) that  V t ( K t j ) satisfies the following Bellman equation:
(9)  V t ( K t j) =  max  K t+Δ j ,  K 1t+Δ j ,  I t j,  L t j  (1 − πΔ)  [ D 0t j Δ +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K t+Δ j ) ] 
 + πΔ [ D 1t j +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j ) ]  
subject to
(10)      D 0t j Δ +  Q t K t+Δ j =  R t  K t jΔ +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j, 
(11)  D 1t j +  Q t  K 1t+Δ j +  L t j +  I t j =  R t  K t jΔ +  L t j +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j +  Q t  I t j, 
(12)  I t j ≤  R t  K t jΔ +  L t j, 
and a credit constraint described below. Equations (10) and (11) are the flow-
of-funds constraints. Equation (12) is the financing constraint, which means that 
investment spending  I t j is limited by internal funds  R t  K t jΔ and debt  L t j. 
The most important assumption of our model is as follows.
ASSUMPTION 4: Loans are subject to a credit constraint endogenously derived 
from an incentive constraint in an optimal contract with limited commitment.
The contract specifies investment  I t j and loans  L t j at time  t and repayment  L t j at 
the end of period  [t, t + Δ], when an investment opportunity arrives with Poisson 
9 There is no difference between a flow dividend  D 0t j Δ and a lump-sum dividend  D 1t j in discrete time with Δ = 1. But it is important for the convergence to the continuous-time limit as  Δ → 0 due to the nature of Poisson 
shocks. 
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probability  πΔ. Firm  j may default on its debt at the end of period  [t, t + Δ] . If it 
defaults, then the firm and the lender will renegotiate the loan repayment in a Nash 
bargaining problem. The loan repayment is determined by the threat value to the 
lender. Specifically, the lender threatens to seize a fraction  ξ ∈  (0, 1) of depreciated 
capital  (1 − δΔ)  K t j and take over the firm. The remaining fraction represents default 
costs, which include direct costs of legal expenses and indirect costs resulting from 
conflicts of interest between the lender and the borrower (Hennessy and Whited 
2007). Alternatively, we may interpret  ξ as an efficiency parameter in the sense 
that the lender may not be able to efficiently use the firm’s assets  (1 − δΔ)  K t j. The 
lender can run the firm with assets  ξ (1 − δΔ)  K  t j from time  t + Δ onward and obtain 
firm value  e −rΔ  V t+Δ (ξ (1 − δΔ)  K t j ) at the end of period  [t, t + Δ] . This value is the 
threat value to the lender.
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that the firm has all the 
bargaining power in the renegotiation through Nash bargaining so that the rene-
gotiated repayment is equal to the threat value. After repaying the debt, the firm 
continues operating its business as usual. The key difference between our model 
and that of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) is that the threat value to the lender is the 
going-concern value in our model, while they assume that the lender liquidates the 
firm’s assets and obtains the liquidation value in the event of default.10 In our model 
the bubble is tied to the firm so that it survives default and the lender can seize the 
bubble.
Enforcement requires that, after an investment opportunity arrives at time  t, the 
continuation value to the firm of not defaulting be no lower than the continuation 
value of defaulting, that is
  − L t j +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j ) ≥ − e −rΔ  V t+Δ (ξ (1 − δΔ)  K t j ) +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j ), 
where we have canceled out some common terms on the two sides of the inequality 
(see Figure 1). This constraint ensures that there is no default in an optimal contract. 
Simplifying yields the credit constraint
(13)  L t j ≤  e −rΔ  V t+Δ (ξ (1 − δΔ)  K t j ). 
The continuous-time limit of the previous dynamic programming problem as 
Δ → 0 becomes
(14)   r V t ( K t j) =  max  K ̇ t j,  K 1t ,  I t j,  L t j   D 0t j +  V ̇t ( K t j) + π ( Q t − 1)  I t j
 + π [ Q t  K t j −  Q t  K 1t j +  V t ( K 1t j ) −  V t ( K t j) ]  
10 US bankruptcy law has recognized the need to preserve the going-concern value when reorganizing busi-
nesses in order to maximize recoveries by creditors and shareholders (see 11 USC. 1101 et seq.). Bankruptcy laws 
seek to preserve the going-concern value whenever possible by promoting the reorganization, as opposed to the 
liquidation, of businesses. Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) find empirical evidence that Chapter 11 reorganizations are 
less costly and more widely observed than Chapter 7 liquidations. 
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subject to
(15)  D 0t j =  R t  K t j −  Q t ( K ̇ t j + δ K t j) ,  
(16)  I t j ≤  L t j,  
(17)  L t j ≤  V t (ξ K t j ). 
Since internal funds  R t  K t jΔ come as flows, the limit vanishes as  Δ → 0 so that (12) converges to (16). Thus, internal cash flows do not help finance lumpy invest-
ment. The continuous-time limit of (11) becomes  D 1t j =  Q t  I t j −  I t j +  Q t  K t j −  Q t  K 1t j . Total expected dividends are  D t j =  D 0t j + π D 1t j . Capital may jump from  K t j
to  K 1t j at the time of investment. In Section III, we will show that this jump does not 
affect the solution given Assumption 3 and constant-returns-to-scale technology.
C. Competitive Equilibrium
Let  K t =  ∫ 0 1 K t j  dj,  I t =  ∫ 0 1 I t j  dj, and  Y t =  ∫ 0 1 Y t j  dj denote the aggregate capital 
stock, aggregate investment of firms with investment opportunities, and aggre-
gate output, respectively. Then a competitive equilibrium is defined as the paths of 
 { Y t } ,  { C t } ,  { K t } ,  { I t } ,  { N t } ,  { w t } ,  { R t } ,  { V t ( K t j )},  { I t j },  { K t j }, and  { N t j } such that house-
holds and firms optimize and markets clear, i.e.,  ψ t  j = 1,  N t =  ∫ 0 1 N t j  dj = 1, 
 C t + π I t =  Y t , and  K ̇ t = − δ K t + π I t . The last equation is the continuous-time 
limit of the following market-clearing condition for capital goods as  Δ → 0: 
  K t+Δ ≡  (1 − πΔ)  ∫   
 
 K t+Δ j dj + πΔ  ∫   
 
 K 1t+Δ  j dj =  ∫   
 
 (1 − δΔ)  K t j  dj + πΔ ∫   
 
 I t j  dj, 
where the right-hand (left-hand) side of the last equality gives the aggregate supply 
(demand) of capital.
III. Equilibrium System
We first solve an individual firm’s dynamic programming problem (14) subject to 
(15), (16), and (17) when the wage rate  w t or  R t in (8) is taken as given. This prob-
lem does not give a contraction mapping and hence may admit multiple solutions. 
We conjecture and verify that the ex ante firm value takes the following form:
(18)  V t ( K t j ) =  Q t  K t j +  B t ,  
where  B t is a variable to be determined. Since firm value  V t ( K t j) is always nonneg-
ative, we must have  B t ≥ 0. Note that  B t = 0 is a possible solution in general 
equilibrium. In this case we interpret  Q t  K t j as the fundamental value of the firm. The 
fundamental value is proportional to the firm’s physical assets  K t  j, and has the same 
form as in Hayashi (1982). There may be another solution in which  B t > 0 due to 
optimistic beliefs. In this case, we interpret  B t as a bubble component since the firm 
is still valued at  B t even when there is no fundamental, i.e.,  K t j = 0. In Section VA 
we will show that when an intrinsically useless asset is traded in the market, its price 
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and  B t follow the same asset-pricing equation (i.e., they are perfect substitutes), fur-
ther justifying our interpretation of  B t as a bubble component.
The following result characterizes firm  j ’s optimization problem and its proof 
along with the proofs of other results in the baseline model is given in online 
Appendix A.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that  Q t > 1 . Then the optimal investment level when an 
investment opportunity arrives is given by
(19)  I t j = ξ Q t  K t j +  B t ,  
where
(20)  B ̇ t = r B t −  B t π( Q t − 1), 
(21)  Q ̇ t =  (r + δ)  Q t −  R t − πξ Q t ( Q t − 1), 
and  R t is given by (8). Moreover,  K ̇ t j and  K 1t  j are indeterminate and the following 
transversality conditions hold:
(22)  lim 
T→∞ e −rT  Q T  K T j = 0,  lim T→∞ e −rT B T = 0. 
To better understand the intuition behind this proposition, we consider the dis-
crete-time problem (9) and conjecture  V t ( K t j) =  a t  K t j +  b t , where  b t ≥ 0 is a bub-
ble component. Substituting this conjecture and equations (10) and (11) into (9), we 
can rewrite the firm’s dynamic programming problem as
(23)  a t  K t j +  b t =  max  K t+Δ j ,  K 1t+Δ j ,  I t j,  L t j  R t  K t 
jΔ +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j +  e −rΔ  b t+Δ 
 +  (1 − πΔ) [− Q t  K t+Δ j +  e −rΔ  a t+Δ  K t+Δ j ] 
 + πΔ [ ( Q t − 1)  I t j −  Q t  K 1t+Δ j +  e −rΔ  a t+Δ  K 1t+Δ j ] 
subject to
(24)   I t j ≤  R t  K t jΔ +  L t j ≤  R t  K t jΔ +  e −rΔ ( a t+Δ (1 − δΔ) ξ  K t j +  b t+Δ ) ,  
where the last inequality follows from (13).
Constant-returns-to-scale technology implies that the objective function in (23) 
is linear in  K t+Δ j and  K 1t+Δ j . Optimization gives  Q t =  e −rΔ  a t+Δ so that the capital 
price  Q t is equal to the marginal value of capital or Tobin’s marginal Q. Thus, firm 
j is indifferent between buying and selling capital, as it cannot use capital sales to 
finance investment anyway due to Assumption 3. It is possible that some firms 
grow slower and others grow faster. The firm size is bounded by the aggregate 
capital stock. The indeterminacy of firm dynamics at the micro-level will not 
affect the aggregate equilibrium dynamics as shown in Proposition 2, which is our 
focus.
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When an investment opportunity arrives at the beginning of period  [t, t + Δ] , one 
unit of investment transforms one unit of consumption good into one unit of new 
capital, which is sold at the price  Q t at the end of period  [t, t + Δ] . If  Q t > 1, the 
firm will make as much investment as possible so that the financing constraint (12) 
and the credit constraint (13) bind. If  Q t = 1, the investment level is indetermi-
nate. If  Q t < 1, the firm will make as little investment as possible. This investment 
choice is similar to Tobin’s Q theory (Tobin 1969; Hayashi 1982). In what follows, 
we impose assumptions to ensure  Q t > 1 in the neighborhood of the steady state so 
that optimal investment is given by
(25)  I t j =  R t  K t jΔ +  Q t (1 − δΔ) ξ K t j +  e −rΔ  b t+Δ . 
An optimistic belief about the stock market value of the firm due to a bubble 
component  b t costs the representative household  b t additional units of consumption 
good to buy one unit of the stock. The bubble generates a discounted resale value 
e −rΔ  b t+Δ . The bubble also relaxes the credit constraint (13) and raises investment 
by  e −rΔ  b t+Δ as (25) shows. This investment generates additional dividends  ( Q t − 1) 
with probability  πΔ as (23) shows. Thus, the total discounted benefit of the bubble 
is  [πΔ ( Q t − 1) + 1]  e −rΔ  b t+Δ . Equating the benefit with the cost yields
(26)  b t =  [πΔ ( Q t − 1) + 1]  e −rΔ  b t+Δ . 
This is the positive feedback loop mechanism supporting bubbles in our model.
We define  B t =  e −rΔ  b t+Δ and take the continuous-time limit as  Δ → 0 to 
derive (18), (19), and (20). We call  π ( Q t − 1) the liquidity premium of the bubble, 
which reflects the additional dividends generated by the stock price bubble. By sub-
stituting (25) back into (23), matching coefficients of  K t j, and then taking the con-
tinuous-time limit as  Δ → 0, we obtain (21). This equation shows that the return 
on capital is given by
(27)   R t − δ Q t +  Q ̇ t   ___________ Q t  = r − ξπ ( Q t − 1) . 
Since a fraction  ξ of capital can be used as collateral to borrow, one unit of capital 
can finance  ξ Q t units of investment by (19), thereby generating  ξπ Q t ( Q t − 1) units 
of additional dividends. The term  ξπ ( Q t − 1) represents the liquidity premium of 
capital.
Through the firm’s decision problem (23), we can understand the difference 
between our mechanism and that of Martin and Ventura (2011, 2012).11 In their 
OLG models a young productive entrepreneur can create a new firm at each date 
and use its future value as collateral to borrow from unproductive entrepreneurs 
(savers). The new bubble attached to this firm can relax credit constraints and raise 
11 There are many other differences in model setups and predictions, not discussed here. 
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 investment. This crowding-in effect is similar to that described in (24). However 
the new bubble is not supported by the positive feedback loop mechanism as in 
(26) because productive entrepreneurs do not solve a dynamic programming prob-
lem like (23). Moreover old bubbles created by the previous generations crowd out 
investment and can also emerge in equilibrium. All new and old bubbles in their 
models are supported by pyramid schemes like  b t =  e −rΔ  b t+Δ so that the growth 
rate of bubbles equals the stock return (discount rate). Thus, bubbles can be ruled 
out by transversality conditions. Bubbles serve as a store of value and can be sold 
from old agents to young agents as in Tirole (1985). By contrast, in our model a 
stock price bubble can emerge only when it can relax credit constraints and provide 
a liquidity premium.
We can reinterpret our credit constraint (17) as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) 
and Gertler and Karadi (2011). In particular, in the discrete-time approximation, 
(13) is equivalent to
  Q t  I t  j −  L t j −  Q t ( K 1t+Δ j − (1 − δΔ)  K t j ) +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j )
 ≥  Q t  I t j +  (1 − ξ)  (1 − δΔ)  Q t  K t j, 
where  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j ) =  Q t  K 1t+Δ j +  B t . The left-hand side of the inequality 
above is the continuation value of the firm if it chooses to repay the debt  L t j. The 
right-hand side is the value if the firm chooses to default by stealing the selling value 
of new capital  Q t  I t j and a fraction  1 − ξ of the selling value of depreciated capital. 
The defaulting firm is shut down and the lender gets nothing. The stock price bub-
ble  B t can still relax the incentive constraint by raising the value to the firm of not 
defaulting. It plays the role of maintaining reputations of the firm to repay its debt.
Although our model features a constant-returns-to-scale technology, marginal  Q 
is not equal to average  Q in the presence of bubbles, because (18) implies that aver-
age  Q is equal to
  
 V t ( K t j) _ K t j =  Q t +  
 B t  _ K t j  for  B t > 0. 
Thus, the existence of stock price bubbles invalidates Hayashi’s (1982) result. In 
the empirical investment literature, researchers typically use average  Q to measure 
marginal  Q under the constant-returns-to-scale assumption because marginal  Q is 
not observable. Our analysis shows that this method may be misleading.
Now we aggregate individual firms’ decision rules and impose market-clearing 
conditions. We then characterize a competitive equilibrium by a system of three 
nonlinear differential equations.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that  Q t > 1. Then the equilibrium variables  ( B t ,  Q t ,  K t ) 
satisfy the system of differential equations, (20), (21), and
(28)  K ̇ t = − δ K t + π(ξ Q t  K t +  B t ),   K 0 given, 
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where  R t = α K t α−1 . The usual transversality conditions hold.
Equation (28) gives the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock derived 
from the market-clearing condition for capital. We use the market-clearing condi-
tion for labor and (8) to derive  R t = α K t α−1 . The system of differential equations (20), (21), and (28) provides a tractable way to analyze equilibrium.
If we just focus on the firm’s optimization problem in partial equilibrium taking 
Q t and  w t as given, then  V t ( K t j ) =  Q t  K t j +  B t with  B t > 0 gives the maximal firm 
value. However, since  V t ( K t j ) is the stock price, it is prone to speculation in general 
equilibrium. We will show later that both  B t = 0 and  B t > 0 can be supported 
in general equilibrium under certain conditions. That is, our model has multiple 
equilibria. This reflects the usual notion of a competitive equilibrium: given a price 
system, individuals optimize. If this price system also clears all markets, then it is an 
equilibrium system. There could be multiple equilibria with different price systems 
and different price systems would generate different optimization problems with 
different sets of constraints.
After obtaining the solution for  ( B t ,  Q t ,  K t ) , we can derive the equilibrium 
wage rate  w t =  (1 − α)  K t α , aggregate output  Y t =  K t α , aggregate investment 
 π I t = π (ξ Q t  K t +  B t ) , and aggregate consumption  C t =  Y t − π I t . 
IV. Analysis of Multiple Equilibria
We study three types of equilibria.12 The first type is bubbleless in which  B t = 0 
for all  t. The second type is bubbly in which  B t > 0 for all  t. For the third type the 
economy switches from a bubbly equilibrium to a bubbleless equilibrium. All three 
types of equilibria can exist due to self-fulfilling beliefs.
A. Bubbleless Equilibrium
In a bubbleless equilibrium  B t = 0 for all  t. Equation (20) becomes an identity. 
We only need to focus on  ( Q t ,  K t ) as determined by the differential equations (21) 
and (28) in which  B t = 0 for all  t . We first analyze the steady state, in which all 
aggregate variables are constant over time so that  Q ̇ t =  K ̇ t = 0 . We use a variable 
without a time subscript to denote its steady-state value and use a variable with an 
asterisk to denote its value in the bubbleless equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 3: (i) If
(29)  ξ ≥  δ _π, 
then there exists a unique bubbleless steady-state equilibrium with  Q ∗ =  Q E ≡ 1 
and  K ∗ =  K E , where  K E is the efficient capital stock satisfying  α ( K E ) α−1 = r + δ. 
12 We focus on the case where either all firms have bubbles of the same size in their stock prices or no firms have 
bubbles. It is possible to have another type of equilibrium in which different firms have bubbles of different sizes in 
their stock prices. See online Appendix D. 
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(ii) If
(30)  0 < ξ <  δ _π, 
then there exists a unique bubbleless steady-state equilibrium with
(31)  Q ∗ =  δ _ πξ > 1,
(32) α  ( K ∗ ) α−1 =  rδ _πξ + δ. 
In addition,  K ∗ <  K E . 
Assumption (29) says that if firms pledge sufficient assets as collateral, then the 
credit constraint will not bind in equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium alloca-
tion is the same as the efficient allocation. The latter is achieved by solving a social 
planner’s problem in which the social planner maximizes the representative house-
hold’s utility subject to the resource constraint only. Note that we assume that the 
social planner also faces stochastic investment opportunities, similar to firms in a 
competitive equilibrium. Unlike firms in a competitive equilibrium, the social plan-
ner is not subject to credit constraints.
Assumption (30) says that if firms cannot pledge sufficient assets as collateral, 
then the credit constraint will be sufficiently tight so that firms are credit constrained 
in the neighborhood of the steady-state equilibrium in which  Q ∗ > 1 . We can then 
apply Proposition 2 in this neighborhood. Proposition 3 also shows that the steady-
state capital stock for the bubbleless equilibrium is less than the efficient steady-
state capital stock. This reflects the fact that not enough resources are transferred 
from savers to investors due to financial frictions.
We can verify that  R ∗ K ∗ > π I ∗ = δ K ∗ so that firms without investment oppor-
tunities have enough funds to lend to firms with investment opportunities in the 
bubbleless steady state and hence in the neighborhood of the bubbleless steady 
state. More intuitively, during period  [t, t + Δ] , investing firms need a total of  I t πΔ 
in funds to finance investment . Firms without investment opportunities possess a 
total of  (1 − πΔ)  R t  K t Δ in cash. In a neighborhood of the bubbleless steady state, (1 − πΔ)  R t  K t Δ >  I t πΔ for a sufficiently small  Δ. 
For (30) to hold, the arrival rate  π of investment opportunities must be sufficiently 
small, holding everything else constant. The intuition is that if  π is too high, then too 
many firms will have investment opportunities, which would make the accumulated 
aggregate capital stock so large as to lower the capital price  Q to the efficient level 
as shown in part (i) of Proposition 3. Condition (30) requires that technological 
constraints at the firm level be sufficiently tight.
To study the local dynamics around the bubbleless steady state  ( Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) , we lin-
earize the system of differential equations (21) and (28) around  ( Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) for  B t = 0 
for all  t. We can easily show that the linearized system has a positive eigenvalue and 
a negative eigenvalue so that  ( Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) is a saddle point. Thus, in the neighborhood 
of  ( Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) , for any given initial value  K 0 , there is a unique initial value  Q 0 such that ( Q t ,  K t ) converges to the bubbleless steady state  ( Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) along a unique saddle path 
as  t → ∞ .
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B. Bubbly Equilibrium
In this section we study the bubbly equilibrium in which  B t > 0 for all  t. We will 
analyze the dynamic system for  ( B t ,  Q t ,  K t ) given in (20), (21), and (28). We first 
rewrite (20) as
(33)   B ̇ t  _ B t = r − π( Q t − 1) for  B t > 0. 
This equation shows that the return on the stock price bubble  B ̇ t / B t is equal to the 
discount rate minus the liquidity premium. As discussed in Section III, stock price 
bubbles in our model can influence dividends due to the positive feedback loop 
effect through our credit constraint (17) or (24). The liquidity premium  π( Q t − 1) 
makes the growth rate of bubbles lower than the discount rate  r . Thus, transversality 
conditions cannot rule out bubbles in our model. We can also show that the bubble-
less equilibrium is dynamically efficient in our model. Specifically, the golden rule 
capital stock is given by  K GR =  (δ/α)  1 _ α−1 . One can verify that  K ∗ <  K GR . Thus, 
the condition that the economy must be dynamically inefficient in Tirole (1985) 
cannot ensure the existence of bubbles in our model. Next we will give our new 
conditions.
Steady State.—We first study the existence of a bubbly steady state in which 
B > 0. We use a variable with a subscript  b to denote its bubbly steady-state value.
PROPOSITION 4: There exists a bubbly steady state satisfying
(34)  B _  K b =  
δ _π − ξ( r _ π + 1) > 0,  
(35)  Q b =  r _ π + 1 > 1, 
(36)  R b = α ( K b ) α−1 = [(1 − ξ) r + δ]( r _ π + 1),  
if and only if the following condition holds:
(37)  0 < ξ <  δ _ r + π. 
In addition, (i)  Q b <  Q ∗ , (ii)  K GR >  K E >  K b >  K ∗ , (iii)  C E >  C b >  C ∗ , 
and (iv) the bubble-asset ratio  B/ K b decreases with  ξ. 
Condition (37) reveals that bubbles emerge when  ξ is sufficiently small, ceteris 
paribus. The intuition is as follows. When the degree of pledgeability is sufficiently 
low, the credit constraint is too tight. A bubble can help relax this constraint and 
allows firms to borrow more and invest more. If the credit constraint is not tight 
enough, firms would be able to borrow sufficient funds to finance investment. In this 
case a bubble serves no function.
Note that condition (37) implies condition (30). Thus, if condition (37) holds, 
then there exist two steady-state equilibria: one bubbleless and the other bubbly. 
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The bubbleless steady state has been analyzed in Proposition 3. Propositions 3 and 
4 reveal that the steady-state capital price is lower in the bubbly equilibrium than in 
the bubbleless equilibrium, i.e.,  Q b <  Q ∗ . The intuition is as follows. Bubbles help 
relax credit constraints and induce firms to make more investment than in the case 
without bubbles. The increased capital stock in the bubbly equilibrium lowers the 
marginal product of capital. Since the capital price partly reflects the present value 
of the marginal product of capital by (21), it is lower in the bubbly steady state than 
in the bubbleless steady state.
We can verify that  R b K b > π I b = δ K b in the bubbly steady state. By a similar 
analysis to that in Section IVA, we deduce that firms without investment opportuni-
ties have enough funds to lend to investing firms to finance investment in a neigh-
borhood of the bubbly steady state.
As mentioned in Section I, an important implication of our model is that stocks 
with positive dividends and stock price bubbles can coexist in the steady state. To 
see this point, we can show that aggregate dividends in the bubbly steady state are 
given by
  ∫   
 
 D 0 j  dj + π ∫   
 
 D 1 j  dj =  R b  K b − π I b =  ( R b − δ)  K b > 0. 
This is consistent with the dynamic efficiency criterion in Abel et al. (1989).
Do stock price bubbles crowd out capital in the steady state? In Tirole’s (1985) 
OLG model, households may use part of their savings to buy bubble assets instead 
of accumulating capital. Thus, bubbles crowd out capital in the steady state. In our 
model, bubbles are attached to productive assets. If the capital price were the same 
in the bubbly and bubbleless steady states, then bubbles would induce firms to invest 
more and hence to accumulate more capital stock. On the other hand, there is a 
general equilibrium price feedback effect as discussed earlier. The lower capital 
price in the bubbly steady state discourages firms from investing because it tightens 
credit constraints. The net effect is that bubbles lead to higher capital accumulation, 
contrary to Tirole’s (1985) result.
The stock price bubble improves resource allocation even if it does not bring the 
economy to the first-best allocation. As Proposition 4 shows, the bubbly steady-state 
capital stock  K b is higher than the bubbleless steady-state level  K ∗ , but lower than the 
first-best steady-state level  K E , which in turn is lower than the golden rule level  K GR . 
Moreover the bubble helps improve welfare in terms of consumption, i.e.,  C E > 
C b >  C ∗ . By contrast, bubbles overcome dynamic inefficiency by crowding out 
capital in Tirole’s (1985) OLG model. Introducing credit constraints and recurrent 
bubbles to Tirole’s (1985) model, Martin and Ventura (2012) show that new bubbles 
raise investment and this effect can dominate the crowding-out effect of old bubbles.
How does the parameter  ξ affect the size of bubbles? Proposition 4 shows that a 
smaller  ξ leads to a larger bubble relative to capital in the steady state. This is intu-
itive. If firms can only pledge a smaller amount of capital, they will face a tighter 
credit constraint so that a larger bubble will emerge to relax this constraint.
Dynamics.—Now we study the stability of the bubbleless and bubbly steady states 
and their local dynamics. We linearize the equilibrium system (20), (21), and (28) 
around the two steady states. We then compute the eigenvalues of the linearized  system 
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and compare the number of stable eigenvalues with the number of  predetermined vari-
ables (Coddington and Levinson 1955). The equilibrium system has only one prede-
termined variable  K t and two non-predetermined variables,  B t and  Q t . 
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that condition (37) holds. Then there exists a unique 
local equilibrium around the bubbly steady state  (B,  Q b ,  K b ) and the local equilib-
rium around the bubbleless steady state  (0,  Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) has indeterminacy of degree 1.
We prove that there is a unique stable eigenvalue for the linearized system around 
the bubbly steady state. Thus, there is a neighborhood   ⊂  핉 + 3 of the bubbly steady 
state  (B,  Q b ,  K b ) and a continuously differentiable function  ϕ  :  →  핉 2 such that 
given any  K 0 there exists a unique solution  ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ) to the equation  ϕ ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ,  K 0 ) = 0 with  ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ,  K 0 ) ∈ , and  ( B t ,  Q t ,  K t ) converges to  (B,  Q b ,  K b ) starting at 
 ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ,  K 0 ) as  t approaches infinity. The set of points  (B, Q, K) satisfying the equa-
tion  ϕ (B, Q, K) = 0 is a one-dimensional stable manifold of the system. If the 
initial value  ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ,  K 0 ) is on the stable manifold, then the solution to the non-
linear system (20), (21), and (28) is also on the stable manifold and converges to 
 (B,  Q b ,  K b ) as  t approaches infinity.
Although the bubbleless steady state  (0,  Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) is also a local saddle point, the 
local dynamics around this steady state are different. In online Appendix A we prove 
that the stable manifold for the bubbleless steady state is two dimensional because 
there are two stable eigenvalues for the linearized system around the bubbleless 
steady state. Thus, the local equilibrium has indeterminacy of degree 1. Formally, 
there is a neighborhood  N ∗ ⊂  핉 + 3 of  (0,  Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) and a continuously differentiable 
function  ϕ ∗  :    ∗ → 핉 such that given  K 0 for any  B 0 > 0 there exists a unique solu-
tion  Q 0 to the equation  ϕ ∗ ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ,  K 0 ) = 0 with  ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ,  K 0 ) ∈   ∗ , and  ( B t ,  Q t ,  K t ) 
converges to  (0,  Q ∗ ,  K ∗ ) starting at  ( B 0 ,  Q 0 ,  K 0 ) as  t approaches infinity. Intuitively, 
along the two-dimensional stable manifold, the bubbly equilibrium is asymptoti-
cally bubbleless in that bubbles will burst eventually. There exist multiple bubbly 
equilibrium paths converging to the bubbleless steady state and the initial value 
B 0 > 0 is indeterminate. This feature suggests that self-fulfilling beliefs can gener-
ate economic fluctuations without any shocks to economic fundamentals.
Figure 2 illustrates the transition paths of capital and the stock price bubble 
around the bubbly steady state, given two initial values of capital. For larger initial 
capital (corresponding to solid lines), the capital price is lower so that investment is 
less profitable and the liquidity premium is lower. Thus, the initial size of the bubble 
is smaller. The bubble then gradually expands to the bubbly steady state and the 
capital stock gradually decreases to the bubbly steady state. The opposite is true for 
the case with lower initial capital.
C. Equilibrium with Stochastic Bubbles
So far we have focused on deterministic bubbles. Following Blanchard and 
Watson (1982) and Weil (1987), we now introduce stochastic bubbles to the base-
line model in Section II with intratemporal loans. Suppose that a stock price bubble 
exists initially, i.e.,  B 0 > 0 . At the beginning of period  [t, t + Δ] before production, 
the bubble bursts with Poisson probability  θΔ (see Figure 1). Once it bursts, it will 
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never have value again and the economy is at the bubbleless equilibrium studied 
in Section IVA.13 This event is independent of the Poisson investment opportunity 
shock.
We use a variable with an asterisk (except for aggregate capital  K t ) to denote its 
value in the bubbleless equilibrium. In particular,  V t ∗ ( K t j ) =  Q t ∗  K t j denotes firm  j ’s 
value function, where  Q t ∗ = G ( K t ) for some function  G. Let  V t ( K t j ) denote the 
value function prior to the two Poisson shocks. Then firm  j ’s dynamic programming 
problem in continuous time becomes
  r V t ( K t j) =  max  I t j,  K ̇ t j,  K 1t j ,  L t j   R t  K t j −  Q t ( K ̇ t j + δ  K t j) +  V ̇t ( K t j) + π ( Q t − 1)  I t j
 + π [ Q t  K t j −  Q t  K 1t j +  V t ( K 1t j ) −  V t ( K t j) ] 
 + θ [ V t ∗ ( K t j) −  V t ( K t j) ] ,
subject to (16) and (17). The expression on the third line reflects the fact that once 
the bubble bursts, firm value changes from  V t ( K t j) to  V t ∗ ( K t j ). In online Appendix A 
we show that  V t ( K t j ) =  Q t  K t j +  B t . 
13 If a bubble reemerges in the future, it would have value today by its asset-pricing equation. See Martin and 
Ventura (2012), Wang and Wen (2012), Galí (2014), and Miao, Wang, and Xu (2015) for models of recurrent 
bubbles. 
Figure 2. Transition Paths for Capital and the Stock Price Bubble
Note: The parameter values are  r = 0.02 ,  α = 0.4,  δ = 0.025 ,  π = 0.01 , and  ξ = 0.2 .
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PROPOSITION 6: Suppose  Q t > 1. Before the bubble bursts, the equilibrium with 
stochastic bubbles  ( B t ,  Q t ,  K t ) satisfies the following system of differential equations:
(38)       B ̇ t = (r + θ)  B t − π( Q t − 1) B t , 
(39)  Q ̇ t = (r + δ + θ)  Q t − θ Q t ∗ −  R t − π( Q t − 1) ξ Q t ,  
and (28), where  R t = α K t α−1 and  Q t ∗ = G ( K t ) is the capital price after the bubble 
bursts.
Equation (38) is an asset-pricing equation for the bubble and reflects the possi-
bility of its collapse. In general, it is difficult to characterize the full set of equilibria 
with stochastic bubbles. In order to transparently illustrate the adverse impact of 
the collapse of a bubble on the economy, we consider a simple type of equilibrium. 
Following Weil (1987) and Kocherlakota (2009), we study a stationary equilibrium 
with stochastic bubbles that has the following properties: the capital stock, the stock 
price bubble, and the capital price are constant at  K s ,  B s , and  Q s before the bubble 
collapses. Immediately after the bubble collapses, the capital stock gradually moves 
to the bubbleless steady-state value  K ∗ , the bubble drops to 0 and stays there forever, 
and the capital price jumps to  Q t ∗ before gradually moving to the bubbleless steady-
state value  Q ∗ given in (31).
PROPOSITION 7: Let condition (37) hold. If
  0 < θ <  θ ∗ ≡  δ _ξ − π − r, 
then there exists a stationary equilibrium  ( B s ,  Q s ,  K s ) with stochastic bubbles such 
that  K s >  K ∗ . In addition, if  θ is sufficiently small, then consumption falls eventu-
ally after the bubble bursts.
As in Weil (1987), a stationary equilibrium with stochastic bubbles exists if the 
probability that the bubble will burst is sufficiently small. In Weil’s (1987) OLG 
model, the capital stock and output eventually rise after the bubble collapses. In con-
trast to his result, in our model consumption, capital and output all fall eventually and 
the economy enters a recession after the bubble bursts. The intuition is that the col-
lapse of the bubble tightens the credit constraint and impairs investment efficiency.
Proposition 7 compares the economies before and after the bubble collapses only 
in the steady state. We now solve for the transition path numerically and present the 
results in Figure 3. In this numerical example we assume that the bubble collapses 
at time  t = 20. Immediately after the bubble collapses, investment falls discontin-
uously and then gradually decreases to its bubbleless steady-state level. But output 
and capital decrease continuously to their bubbleless steady-state levels since cap-
ital is predetermined and labor is exogenous. Consumption rises initially because 
of the fall in investment,14 but it quickly falls and then decreases to its bubbleless 
14 One way to generate the fall in consumption and output on impact is to introduce endogenous capacity uti-
lization. Following the collapse of bubbles, the capacity utilization rate falls because the price of installed capital 
2612 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2018
steady-state level. Importantly, stock prices drop discontinuously and the stock mar-
ket crashes immediately after the bubble collapses.
The existing macroeconomic models typically study dynamics around a unique 
deterministic steady state. These models introduce large shocks to economic fun-
damentals to generate a recession. For example, motivated by the recent Great 
Recession, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) introduce 
large capital quality shocks or net worth shocks. This literature is typically silent 
on the stock market behavior. In contrast to this literature, our model features two 
steady states. A change in beliefs or confidence can shift the economy from a “good” 
steady state to a “bad” steady state. A recession and a stock market crash can occur 
without any shocks to the fundamentals.
V. Discussions and Extensions
In this section we discuss our model assumptions and study the robustness of 
our results by analyzing several extensions. Our main message is that a stock price 
bubble can emerge as long as firms need debt financing because other sources of 
financing are insufficient to cover investment spending. And our modeling of credit 
constraints is critical for the emergence of a stock price bubble.
rises. Then both output and consumption would fall on impact. 
Figure 3. Dynamics of the Stationary Equilibrium with Stochastic Bubbles
Notes: The bubble bursts at  t = 20. The parameter values are  r = 0.02,  α = 0.4,  δ = 0.025,  θ = 0.05, 
π = 0.01, and  ξ = 0.2. 
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A. Endogenous Credit Constraints
A key feature of our model is that credit constraints are endogenously derived 
from optimal contracts with limited commitment. As a result equity value enters 
this type of constraints. To see the critical role of this feature, we show that the 
widely adopted Kiyotaki-Moore collateral constraint can generate a pure bubble like 
money, but cannot generate a stock price bubble.15 This feature distinguishes our 
model from the literature on pure bubbles.
We write the Kiyotaki-Moore collateral constraint in discrete time as
(40)  L t j ≤ ξ Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j,  
where  ξ Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j is the liquidation value of the collateralized assets. We may 
reinterpret this constraint as an incentive constraint as in (13), where
  e −rΔ  V t+Δ (ξ (1 − δΔ)  K t j ) 
is replaced by  ξ Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t  j. The continuous-time limit of (40) as  Δ → 0 is
(41)  L t  j ≤ ξ Q t  K t j. 
Now we replace our credit constraint (13) with the Kiyotaki-Moore collateral 
constraint (40) in the baseline model of Section II. Consider firm  j ’s dynamic pro-
gramming problem (9) or ( 23). It follows from (12) and (40) that optimal investment 
satisfies  I t j =  R t  K t jΔ + ξ  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j when  Q t > 1. Substituting this investment 
rule back into (23), we deduce that bubbles grow at the rate  r, i.e.,  b t =  e −rΔ  b t+Δ . 
In this case bubbles do not help finance investment and hence there is no liquidity 
premium. The transversality condition implies that  lim T→∞  e −rΔT  b t  e rΔT =  b t = 0 
and thus no stock price bubble can emerge.
Next we show that a pure bubble can emerge by introducing an intrinsically useless 
asset (e.g., money) with a unit supply for firms and households to trade in the baseline 
model of Section II under the Kiyotaki-Moore collateral constraint (40) or (41).
ASSUMPTION 5: Neither firms nor households can short the intrinsically useless 
asset (e.g., money).
If firms or households could hold unlimited short positions, a pure bubble could 
not emerge due to unlimited arbitrage (Kocherlakota 1992). Let  V t ( K t j,  M t j) denote 
the ex ante market value of firm  j when its capital stock and asset holdings at time  t 
are  K t j and  M t j ≥ 0, respectively. Let  P t denote the market price of the intrinsically 
15 In Chapter 14 of his textbook, Tirole (2006) shows that there may exist multiple equilibria in a simplified 
variant of the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model. In contrast to ours, these equilibria are characterized by a one-di-
mensional nonlinear dynamical system. Some equilibria may exhibit cycles. We would like to thank Jean Tirole for 
a helpful discussion on this point. 
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useless asset. Then firm  j chooses  K t+Δ  j ,  K 1t+Δ  j ,  M t+Δ  j ,  M 1t+Δ  j ,  I t  j, and  L t  j to maximize 
its market value by solving the following Bellman equation:
  V t ( K t  j ,  M t  j) = max  (1 − πΔ)  [ D 0t  j Δ +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K t+Δ  j ,  M t+Δ  j ) ] 
 + πΔ [ D 1t  j +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j ,  M 1t+Δ j ) ] 
subject to (40),
(42)  D 0t  j Δ +  Q t  K t+Δ j =  R t  K t jΔ +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j +  P t ( M t j −  M t+Δ j ) ,  
 (43)  D 1t  j +  Q t  K 1t+Δ  j +  L t j +  I t  j =  R t  K t  jΔ +  L t  j +  P t ( M t  j −  M 1t+Δ  j ) 
 +  Q t  I t  j +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j,  
(44)  I t  j ≤  R t  K t  jΔ +  L t j +  P t ( M t  j −  M 1t+Δ  j ) , 
where  M t+Δ j  ( M 1t+Δ j ) are the asset holdings chosen at time  t when no investment 
arrives (an investment opportunity arrives). Equations (42) and (44) are the flow-
of-funds constraints. Inequality (44) says that firm  j can sell the intrinsically useless 
asset to finance investment.
In online Appendix B.1 we derive the continuous-time limit and show that firm 
value is given by
(45)  V t ( K t j,  M t j) =  Q t  K t  j +  P t  M t  j. 
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium system.
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose that there is an intrinsically useless asset available for 
households and firms to trade in the baseline model under Assumption 5 and the 
credit constraint in (41). If  Q t > 1 , then the continuous-time equilibrium system 
for  ( K t ,  Q t ,  P t ) is given by (21),
 (46)  K ̇ t = −δ K t + π( Q t ξ K t +  P t ),
(47)  P ̇ t = r P t − π( Q t − 1) P t ,  
where  R t = α K t α−1 , and the usual transversality conditions hold. In equilibrium 
households do not hold the intrinsically useless asset and investing firms sell this 
asset to non-investing firms. The steady states are characterized by Propositions 3 
and 4 where  B is replaced by  P. 
A pure bubble is generated through the net worth channel: an investing firm sells 
the intrinsically useless asset to non-investing firms to raise its net worth so that the 
financing constraint (44), instead of the collateral constraint (40) or (41), is relaxed. 
The intrinsically useless asset provides a liquidity premium  π( Q t − 1) and raises 
investment and dividends to support a bubble. Non-investing firms are willing to buy 
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the asset for precautionary reasons because they anticipate that they will be credit 
constrained when a future investment opportunity arrives. This mechanism also 
works for general exogenous or endogenous credit constraints, e.g., the constraint 
that no firms can borrow ( ξ = 0) and the constraint that firms can borrow against a 
fraction of future investment payoffs (Kiyotaki and Moore 2005, 2008; Hirano and 
Yanagawa 2017). Kiyotaki and Moore (2005, 2008) argue that the existence of a 
liquidity premium is critical for the circulation of fiat money.
Comparing Propositions 2 and 8, we find that the stock price bubble and the pure 
bubble satisfy the same equilibrium asset-pricing equation. However, a pure bubble 
cannot be interpreted as a stock price bubble, because they are attached to different 
types of assets. A stock price bubble cannot be attached to a separately traded asset 
different from firm stocks. If a firm does not hold the intrinsically useless asset at 
some time  t , i.e.,  M t j = 0, then its value is equal to  V t ( K t j, 0) =  Q t K t j, implying that 
this firm does not contain a stock price bubble, even though there is a pure bubble 
in the economy.
By contrast, if we adopt a credit constraint similar to (17) based on optimal con-
tracts with limited commitment in continuous time
 (48)  L t  j ≤  V t (ξ K t j, 0) ,  
we show in online Appendix B.1 that firm value is equal to
 (49)  V t ( K t j,  M t j) =  Q t  K t j +  B t +  P t  M t j. 
Thus, firm value consists of a fundamental component  Q t K t j, a bubble component  B t , 
and an asset value component  P t  M t j. Constraint (48) says that firm  j does not use its 
intrinsically useless asset  M t j as collateral, because it has already sold the asset to 
finance investment when an investment opportunity arrives so that the lender cannot 
seize  M t j on default.
PROPOSITION 9: Suppose that there is an intrinsically useless asset for trading in 
the baseline model under Assumption 5 and the credit constraint in (48). If  Q t > 1, 
then the continuous-time equilibrium system for  ( K t ,  Q t ,  B t ,  P t ) is given by (20), (21), (47), and
  K ̇ t = − δ K t + π( Q t ξ K t +  P t +  B t ), 
where  R t = α K t α−1 , and the usual transversality conditions hold. An equilibrium 
can only determine the total size of bubbles  P t +  B t , but not  P t and  B t independently. 
The steady states are characterized by Propositions 3 and 4 where  B is replaced by 
P + B. 
Since the pure bubble  P t and the stock price bubble  B t can help raise investment 
to the same extent, they are perfect substitutes. However, the mechanisms gener-
ating these two types of bubbles are different. A pure bubble is generated when 
investing and non-investing firms trade for the purpose of financing investment. The 
stock price bubble is not sold to finance investment as there is no trade in stocks in 
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 equilibrium. It is in firm value, which is used as collateral to borrow. Unlike the pure 
bubble, the stock price bubble directly raises firm value and hence relaxes the credit 
constraint (48) and the debt limit. This feature provides a positive feedback loop 
to support the stock price bubble. This intuition suggests that other types of credit 
constraints endogenously derived from incentive constraints in optimal contracts 
may generate a stock price bubble as long as firm value enters incentive constraints.
B. Liquidity Mismatch
In the baseline model we have assumed that capital sales are realized after invest-
ment spending, causing a liquidity mismatch (Assumption 3). The interpretation is 
that selling capital may take time so that the proceeds from sales may not be avail-
able at the time of investment (Kiyotaki and Moore 2005, 2008). We now relax this 
assumption by allowing at most a fraction  λ of the proceeds from the sales of existing 
capital to be used to finance investment. Then the financing constraint (12) becomes
(50)  I t j ≤  R t  K t jΔ +  L t j +  Q t [ (1 − δΔ)  K t j −  K 1t+Δ j ] , 
where  K 1t+Δ j satisfies
(51)  K 1t+Δ j ≥  (1 − λ) (1 − δΔ)  K t j. 
In online Appendix B.2 we derive the continuous-time equilibrium system and 
show that the bubbly and bubbleless steady states coexist if and only if
  0 < ξ + λ <  δ _ r + π . 
This implies that as long as  λ is sufficiently small, firms cannot overcome credit 
constraints and a stock price bubble can emerge. Thus, our main insights do not 
change as long as not enough capital can be sold to finance investment due to the illi-
quidity of capital. Our baseline model corresponds to the extreme case with  λ = 0. 
C. Equity Issues
In the baseline model we have assumed that firms cannot issue new equity by 
selling new shares to finance investment (Assumption 3). This assumption is typi-
cally adopted in the literature on models with financial frictions (e.g., Carlstrom and 
Fuerst 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999). If firms could issue unlimited 
amount of new equity, then they would not be financially constrained and a stock 
price bubble could not emerge. What is critical for our results is that equity issues 
are limited so that debt financing is needed.
Based on the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board, Figure 1 
in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) shows that equity payouts in the US nonfinancial 
business sector are almost always positive between 1952:I and 2010:II.16 This figure 
16 Equity payout is defined as dividends and share repurchases minus equity issues of nonfinancial corporate 
businesses, minus the net proprietor’s investment in noncorporate businesses. 
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 suggests that nonfinancial firms on average pay out dividends or repurchase shares 
instead of issuing new equity during that period. Using the same source of data for the 
sample period from 1945 to 2002, Table 2 of Frank and Goyal (2008) shows that net 
debt issues finance a large part of financing deficit (defined as investment and dividends 
minus internal funds). Equity issues are negative and debt issues exceed the financing 
deficit during the last two decades. At the firm level, Hennessy and Whited (2007) find 
that the average ratio of equity issuance to total assets is 8.9 percent for US nonfinan-
cial and unregulated firms during the period from 1988 to 2001 using the Compustat 
database. One explanation for the preceding evidence of limited equity issues is that 
issuing equity incurs direct administrative and underwriting costs and may also risk 
the loss of control. In terms of theory, Myers (1984) argues that firms prefer internal 
to external financing and debt to equity if external financing is used because of adverse 
selection. Issuing new equity may signal bad news to outside shareholders when there 
is information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders.
We can relax our extreme assumption by allowing firms to issue new equity.
ASSUMPTION 6: No firm holds the shares of other firms so that new equity is 
issued to households as shareholders subject to external equity financing costs.
We first show that under this assumption the normalization of the stock supply 
to 1 is innocuous. We use a discrete-time setup to illustrate this point as in Miller 
and Modigliani (1961). Let  n t ,  d t , and  v t denote the number of existing outstanding 
shares, dividends per share, and the cum-dividend stock price per share, respec-
tively. Then the stock price per share satisfies the asset-pricing equation
(52)  v t =  d t Δ +  e −rΔ  v t+Δ . 
Let  V t =  n t  v t denote the total market value of the enterprise and  D t =  n t  d t denote 
total dividends. Suppose that the firm sells the number  m t of new shares at the clos-
ing price  v t+Δ at date  t. Then we have  n t+Δ =  n t +  m t Δ. Multiplying both sides of 
equation (52) by  n t gives
  V t =  D t Δ +  e −rΔ  n t  v t+Δ =  D t Δ +  e −rΔ [ n t+Δ  v t+Δ −  ( n t+Δ −  n t )  v t+Δ ] 
 =  D t Δ −  e −rΔ  m t  v t+Δ Δ +  e −rΔ  n t+Δ  v t+Δ =  ( D t −  S t ) Δ +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ , 
where  S t =  e −rΔ  m t  v t+Δ is the value of new equity. The macroeconomics and 
finance literature often interprets  D t −  S t as “dividends” and negative dividends rep-
resent new equity (e.g., Hennessy and Whited 2007; Jermann and Quadrini 2012). 
By normalizing the total stock supply of the enterprise to 1, we can interpret the 
stock price as the stock market value of the enterprise. The asset-pricing equations 
remain the same as before. Thus, we do not need to explicitly model the change in 
the number of shares.
Now suppose that firm  j can issue new equity to households (shareholders) in 
the discrete-time setup of Section II. Its objective is to maximize the equity value of 
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existing shareholders. It chooses  K t+Δ j ,  K 1t+Δ j ,  I t j ,  L t j ,  S 0t j , and  S 1t j to solve the follow-
ing dynamic programming problem:
  V t (  K t j ) = max  (1 − πΔ) [( D 0t j −  S 0t j ) Δ +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K t+Δ j )] 
 + πΔ [ D 1t j −  S 1t j +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j )] ,
subject to (13),
  D 0t j Δ +  Q t  K t+Δ j =  R t  K t jΔ +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j +  S 0t j Δ −  φ _2   ( S 0t 
j ) 2  _ K t j Δ, 
  D 1t j +  Q t  K 1t+Δ j +  L t j +  I t j =  R t  K t jΔ +  L t j +  S 1t j −  φ _2  
 ( S 1t j ) 2  _ K t j 
 +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j +  Q t  I t j, 
  I t j ≤  R t  K t jΔ +  L t j +  S 1t j , 
where  S 1t j  ( S 0t j ) represents new equity issues when an (no) investment opportunity 
arrives, and  φ ( S 0t j ) 2 /(2 K t j ) and  φ ( S 1t j ) 2 /(2 K t j ) represent external equity financing 
costs.17 The parameter  φ > 0 represents the size of the equity financing cost. 
The preceding two equations are the flow-of-funds constraints. The inequality is 
the financing constraint, which says that investment is financed by internal funds 
 R t  K t jΔ , debt  L t j, and new equity  S 1t  j . 
In online Appendix B.3 we study the continuous-time limit and show that the firm 
will not issue new equity, i.e.,  S 0t j = 0, when no investment opportunity arrives due 
to the equity financing cost. When an investment opportunity arrives and  Q t > 1, 
the firm issues equity
  S 1t  j =  1 _φ ( Q t − 1) K t j. 
The following proposition characterizes the conditions for the existence of a bubbly 
steady state.
PROPOSITION 10: Given Assumption 6 in the baseline model, there exists a unique 
bubbly steady state satisfying
  Q b = 1 +  r _ π > 1,
  B _  K b =   
δ _π − ξ(  r _ π + 1) −  r _ φπ > 0,
  R b = α  ( K b ) α−1 = [(1 − ξ)r + δ] ( r _ π + 1) −  1 _2   r 
2  _ φπ > 0, 
if and only if  0 < ξ(r + π) + r/φ < δ. 
17 Using a structural model based on the Compustat database, Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimate a quadratic 
function of the external equity financing cost. Here we do not consider fixed and linear costs for simplicity. 
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If the equity financing cost is too large, i.e.,  φ → ∞, firms will not issue any equity 
and the proposition reduces to Proposition 4. If the equity financing cost (i.e.,  φ) 
is too small, then the conditions in the proposition are violated. In this case firms 
can issue sufficient new equity to overcome the credit constraints so that a stock 
price bubble could not exist. In the extreme case without equity financing cost (i.e., 
φ = 0 ), firms can issue sufficient new equity to finance investment at the efficient 
level so that the economy attains the efficient equilibrium (Miller and Modigliani 
1961). Thus, our key insights will not change as long as new equity issues are suffi-
ciently limited due to external equity financing costs.
D. Additional Asset with Exogenous Rents
In Section I we have discussed the issue of the rate of return dominance. We 
have shown that our model can generate a stock price bubble in firms with positive 
dividends. One may wonder whether a stock price bubble can still exist if there is 
another asset with exogenous rents that grow as fast as the economy. If this asset is 
as liquid as the stock, it will earn return  r so that it dominates the stock price bub-
ble. Tirole (1985) resolves this issue in an OLG model by assuming that rents are 
not capitalized before their creation. In this subsection we resolve this issue in our 
infinite-horizon model by assuming that the asset with exogenous rents is less liquid 
than the stock price bubble for financing investment. To this end, we introduce an 
asset with exogenous rents  X t = x e gt > 0 paid at each time  t to the baseline model 
of Section II. The supply of the asset is normalized to 1. To prevent unlimited arbi-
trage, we make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 7: Neither households nor firms can short the asset with exogenous 
rents (e.g., land).
We also introduce economic growth by setting the production function as
  Y t  j =  ( K t j ) α  ( A t  N t  j ) 1−α , 
where  A t =  e gt  (g ≥ 0) represents technical progress. A simple way to model the 
illiquidity of the asset is to impose a resaleability constraint in continuous time 
(Kiyotaki and Moore 2008):
(53)  M 1t  j ≥  (1 − ζ)  M t  j,  
where  M t  j ≥ 0 denotes firm  j ’s existing asset holdings and  M 1t  j ≥ 0 denotes firm  j ’s 
new asset holdings when an investment opportunity arrives. The interpretation is 
that firm  j can sell at most a fraction  ζ ∈ (0, 1) of the asset to finance its investment. 
In this case the asset is less liquid than the bubble. For simplicity suppose that firm 
j does not use the asset with rents as collateral and we adopt the credit constraint in 
(48). We still use  V t (  K t j ,  M t j ) to denote firm  j ’s value function.
In online Appendix B.4 we show that  V t ( K t j ,  M t j ) takes the form in (49). For 
Q t > 1, the resaleability constraint (53) binds when an investment opportunity 
arrives, because firm  j will sell the asset to non-investing firms as much as possible 
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to finance investment. The aggregate capital stock  K t , asset price  P t , and stock price 
bubble  B t will all grow at the rate  g. But the capital price  Q t will not grow. Moreover, 
B t ,  Q t , and  P t satisfy the asset-pricing equations (20), (21), and
(54)  P ̇ t = r P t −  X t − π( Q t − 1) ζ P t . 
Thus, the return on the asset with rents is higher than the return on the bubble and
  
 P ̇ t +  X t  _ P t  = r − π( Q t − 1)ζ > r − π( Q t − 1) =  
 B ̇ t  _ B t  for  B t > 0. 
If the asset is fully liquid, i.e.,  ζ = 1, then the two returns are the same and equal to 
0 in the bubbly steady state without growth  (g = 0) . This is impossible if rents  X t 
are positive, generating the rate of return dominance puzzle discussed in Section I.
We solve this puzzle by assuming that the asset with rents is less liquid than the 
stock price bubble, i.e.,  ζ ∈  (0, 1) . In this case the return on the asset with rents is 
higher than the return on the bubble because the asset with rents commands a lower 
liquidity premium than the bubble. Non-investing firms buy the asset with rents for 
a precautionary motive because they anticipate being credit constrained when an 
investment opportunity arrives in the future. Since the return on the asset is lower 
than the discount rate  r, households want to sell the asset until their short-sale con-
straints bind. In equilibrium households do not hold any of the asset.
We also consider the more general case with growth  g > 0. In the bubbly steady 
state,  Q t and the detrended variables  k t =  K t / A t ,  p t =  P t / A t , and  b t =  B t / A t are 
constant over time. The following proposition gives the conditions such that the 
stock price bubble and the asset with growing rents  X t can coexist in the steady state.
PROPOSITION 11: Suppose that there is an asset with growing rents  X t = x e gt 
available for households and firms to trade in the baseline model under Assumption 7. 
Let  Y t j =  ( K t j ) α  ( A t  N t j ) 1−α , where  A t =  e gt . Then there exists a unique bubbly 
steady state  ( Q b ,  k b , b, p) satisfying
  b =   δ + g _π  k b −  Q b ξ k b − ζ p > 0,
 p =  x ___________ (r − g)(1 − ζ) > 0,  Q b =  
r − g
 _π + 1 > 1,
 α k b α−1 =  [r + δ − (r − g)ξ]  ( r − g _π + 1) > 0, 
if and only if
(55)  r > g ≥ 0, 0 < ξ <  δ + g _ r + π − g, 
(56) 0 < x < (r − g)  1 − ζ _ζ [ δ + g _π −  ( r − g _π + 1) ξ]  k b . 
The interpretation of condition (55) is similar to that of (37). The intuition behind 
condition (56) is that the asset with detrended rents  x must be sufficiently illiquid 
(i.e.,  ζ must be sufficiently small), or the detrended dividend  x must be sufficiently 
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small. Otherwise, this asset will dominate the stock price bubble and rule out the 
latter in the steady state.
E. Intertemporal Borrowing and Savings
In this subsection we replace intratemporal debt with risk-free intertemporal 
bonds in the baseline model of Section II.18 With intertemporal bonds, firms can 
raise new debt to payoff old debt. Firms with investment opportunities can use these 
bonds to finance investment subject to credit constraints. Anticipating being credit 
constrained in the future, firms without investment opportunities will save in the 
bonds precautionarily. The bonds are in zero net supply. If bonds and bubbles can 
provide liquidity services to the same extent, they must have the same return or else 
bonds would dominate bubbles. But if the bond return (or the interest rate) is lower 
than the discount rate  r, households would want to short the bonds.
ASSUMPTION 8: Households cannot short intertemporal bonds and firms cannot 
long each other’s stocks (equity shares).
One may interpret the bonds here as corporate bonds issued by firms and house-
holds cannot borrow by issuing corporate bonds. We will show that households will 
never hold any intertemporal bonds in equilibrium, because the equilibrium interest 
rate  r ft is lower than the discount rate  r . A similar result is derived in Kiyotaki and 
Moore (2005, 2008).
Let  L t h ≥ 0 denote the representative household’s bond holdings. Let  L t j > (<) 0 
denote firm  j ’s debt level (saving). The market-clearing condition for the bonds is 
 ∫   
  L t j  dj =  L t h . Let  V t ( K t j ,  L t j) denote the ex ante market value of firm  j when its cap-
ital stock and debt level at time  t are  K t j and  L t j, respectively, prior to the realization 
of the Poisson shock. We suppress the aggregate state variables in the argument. 
Assume that firm  j maximizes its market value and hence it chooses  I t j ,  K t+Δ j ,  K 1t+Δ j , 
L t+Δ j , and  L 1t+Δ j to solve the following dynamic programming problem:
  V t ( K t j ,  L t j ) = max  (1 − πΔ)  [ D 0t j Δ +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K t+Δ j ,  L t+Δ j ) ] 
 + πΔ [ D 1t j +  e −rΔ  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j ,  L 1t+Δ j ) ] ,
subject to
(57)  D 0t j Δ +  Q t K t+Δ j =  R t  K t jΔ +  e − r ft Δ  L t+Δ j −  L t j +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j ,  
(58)  D 1t j +  Q t  K 1t+Δ j +  I t j =  R t  K t jΔ +  e − r ft Δ  L 1t+Δ j −  L t j +  Q t  I t j +  Q t (1 − δΔ)  K t j , 
(59)  I t j ≤  R t  K t jΔ +  e − r ft Δ  L 1t+Δ j −  L t j,  
(60)  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j ,  L 1t+Δ j ) ≥  V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ j , 0) −  V t+Δ (ξ (1 − δΔ)  K t j, 0),  
18 In online Appendix F we study a model in which there is no market for capital goods. Firms make investment 
and accumulate capital on their own. They can use new capital or future capital as collateral to borrow. We show that 
our key insights do not change. See Miao, Wang, and Xu (2015) for a related discrete-time model. 
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where  L 1t+Δ  j ( L t+Δ j ) represents the new debt level or saving when an investment 
opportunity arrives (no investment opportunity arrives). The price of the debt at 
time  t that pays off one unit of consumption good at time  t + Δ is  e − r ft Δ . Equations 
(57) and (58) are the flow-of-funds constraints. Inequality (59) gives the financing 
constraint, which says that investment is financed by internal funds and new debt.
Debt is subject to the credit constraint (60), which is interpreted in a similar 
way to (13). When an investment opportunity arrives at time  t , firm  j borrows 
 e − r ft Δ  L 1t+Δ  j > 0 from other firms without investment opportunities. If it 
does not default on debt  L 1t+Δ  j at time  t + Δ , it obtains continuation value 
 V t+Δ ( K 1t+Δ  j ,  L 1t+Δ  j ). If it defaults, debt is renegotiated and the repayment  L 1t+Δ  j is 
relieved. The new repayment is determined by Nash bargaining. Assume that firm 
j has a full bargaining power. Then the new repayment is given by the threat value 
to the lender, which is equal to the market value of the firm  V t+Δ (ξ (1 − δΔ)  K t  j, 0) 
when the lender takes over the firm and keeps it running by recovering a fraction 
 ξ of depreciated capital  (1 − δΔ)  K t j. The expression on the right-hand side of (60) is the value to the firm if it chooses to default on the previous debt and repay 
 V t+Δ (ξ (1 − δΔ)  K t j, 0) . We then have the incentive constraint in (60).
In online Appendix B.5 we derive equilibria in the continuous-time limit. We 
show that the value function takes the form
(61)  V t ( K t j ,  L t j) =  Q t  K t j −  L t j +  B t ,  
and the continuous-time limit of the credit constraint (60) becomes
(62)  L 1t j ≤  Q t ξ K t j +  B t , 
where  B t ≥ 0 is the bubble component of equity value.
PROPOSITION 12: For the model in this subsection with intertemporal bonds 
under Assumption 8, if  Q t > 1 , then the continuous-time equilibrium system for 
 ( K t ,  Q t ,  B t ,  r ft ) is given by (20), (21), (28), and
(63)  r ft = r − π ( Q t − 1) < r,  
where  R t = α K t α−1 , and the usual transversality conditions hold.
The credit constraint (62) and the continuous-time limit of the financing con-
straint (59) together imply that
  I t j ≤  L 1t j −  L  t j ≤ ξ Q t  K t j +  B t −  L t j. 
When  Q t > 1, it is profitable for firm  j to invest and both constraints bind. We then 
have
  I t j = ξ Q t  K t  j +  B t −  L t j. 
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With intertemporal bonds, firm  j can use both its savings when  L t  j < 0 and new debt ξ Q t  K t j +  B t to finance investment.
Equation (63) shows that the equilibrium interest rate  r ft is equal to the subjective 
discount rate  r minus a liquidity premium  π ( Q t − 1) . The liquidity premium exists 
because bonds can provide liquidity to investing firms by raising their net worth. 
Since the stock price bubble and the bonds can be used to finance investment to the 
same extent, they command the same amount of liquidity premium.
Firms without investment opportunities are willing to save and lend even though 
r ft < r because they anticipate that they will be credit constrained when an invest-
ment opportunity arrives in the future. Their demand for bonds pushes up the bond 
price and lowers the interest rate, which reflects a precautionary saving motive as 
in the incomplete markets models (e.g., Aiyagari 1994). Unlike in Aiyagari (1994), 
however, firms in our model are subject to uninsured idiosyncratic investment 
opportunity shocks and credit constraints.19 To better understand the intuition, we 
consider the discrete-time approximation (see online Appendix B.5). Buying 1 unit 
of bonds at time  t costs  e − r ft Δ dollars. At time  t + Δ , the bond pays off $1. When 
firm  j meets an investment opportunity with probability  πΔ, it uses the bond pay-
off to finance $1 of investment, which generates ( Q t+Δ − 1 ) dollars of dividends. 
Thus, the total discounted marginal benefit from the bond is given by  e −rΔ [1 + 
πΔ( Q t+Δ − 1)]. Equating this marginal benefit with the marginal cost  e − r ft Δ and 
taking the continuous-time limit as  Δ → 0 give (63).
Since  r >  r ft , households want to borrow by selling bonds until their short-sale 
constraints bind, i.e.,  L t h = 0 . We then have the bond market-clearing condition 
 ∫   
  L t j  dj = 0. Without a short-sale constraint, households would keep shorting bonds (or effectively borrowing) until  r ft = r. In this case firms would be able to accumu-
late enough savings in bonds so that their credit constraints would no longer bind. 
The liquidity premium would be zero so that  Q t = 1 and the economy would reach 
the efficient equilibrium and no bubble could exist.
More generally, as long as households are subject to sufficiently tight borrow-
ing limits (or short-sale constraints) in the sense that they cannot issue sufficiently 
many bonds, the efficient equilibrium cannot be attained and there is a scarcity of 
financial assets for savers (firms).20 The existence of a stock price bubble is effec-
tively a way of increasing the supply of financial assets that can be held by firms. 
The government can also play a role in supplying financial assets to firms by issuing 
government bonds, thereby improving efficiency.
PROPOSITION 13: For the model in this subsection with intertemporal bonds, 
if condition (37) holds, then the bubbly and bubbleless steady states with  Q > 1 
coexist. Moreover, the interest rates in the bubbleless and bubbly steady states are 
given by  r f ∗ = r + π − δ/ξ < 0 and  r f = 0, respectively.
19 Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) adopt the costly state verification 
model of debt contracts between entrepreneurs and lenders, in which entrepreneurs can default on debt. In this case 
debt is risky and internal funds earn higher returns than external funds due to agency costs. To prevent entrepreneurs 
from saving to overcome borrowing constraints, one can assume either that entrepreneurs discount the future more 
heavily than households or that entrepreneurs die randomly. By contrast, debt is risk-free in our model and the 
interest rate is lower than the discount rate due to firms’ precautionary saving motives. 
20 See online Appendix E for the analysis of a general short-sale constraint (or borrowing constraint). 
2624 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2018
Under condition (37),  Q t > 1 in a neighborhood of either the bubbleless or the 
bubbly steady state so that Proposition 12 applies. This condition is equivalent to 
the standard condition (Tirole 1985; Santos and Woodford 1997) requiring that the 
interest rate on bonds in the bubbleless steady state be lower than the rate of eco-
nomic growth ( r f ∗ < 0) . Unlike in Tirole (1985), the economy is dynamically effi-
cient in our model. Proposition 13 shows that the interest rate on bonds must be 
equal to 0 in the bubbly steady state ( r f = 0 ), because the steady-state return on 
the stock price bubble  B ̇ t / B t is equal to 0. To generate a positive steady-state interest 
rate, we can introduce economic growth as in Section VD.
It is interesting to compare the steady-state returns on stocks, capital, and bonds. 
By equation (27) and Proposition 13, we can compute these returns in Table 1. 
Under the assumption in Proposition 13, we can show that the stock return is higher 
than the capital return, which is higher than the bond return (or interest rate). The 
return differentials reflect the liquidity premium. Since our model does not feature 
aggregate uncertainty, there is no risk premium. Thus, our model cannot match the 
equity premium and the risk-free rate in the data.
F. Cross-Holdings of Shares
We have assumed that no firm can hold the shares of other firms and trade these 
shares to finance investment. This assumption is justified by the US aggregate and 
firm-level data. From Table F103 of the Flow of Funds Accounts, we find that between 
2005 and 2015 the average ratio of the net acquisition of mutual fund shares (line 
30) to the net acquisition of financial assets (line 16) in the US nonfinancial corpo-
rate business sector is 1.74 percent. In terms of levels, Frank and Goyal (2008) find 
that in the 1990s corporate equity was held heavily by households (39 percent of 
the aggregate equity outstanding), pension and mutual funds (20 percent), insurance 
firms (28 percent), the rest of the world (10 percent), and banks and the government 
(3 percent). Thus, cross-holdings of other firms’ shares by nonfinancial corporations 
account for a negligible fraction in the aggregate data. And trading of other firms’ 
shares is not a major source of external financing for nonfinancial corporations.
We also investigate the firm-level data from 2000 to 2016 using the Compustat 
database. The item ISEQ (investment securities – equity) reports the holdings of 
other firms’ equity. We find that this item is missing for most nonfinancial and 
non-utility firms in our sample. Moreover, for those firms with ISEQ entries, the 
average ratio of ISEQ to total assets in each year ranges from 0 to 1.5 percent, and 
the sample mean is 0.6 percent from 2000 to 2016. By contrast, a large literature has 
found that firms hold a sizable amount of cash (e.g., Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009). 
We find that the average ratio of cash holdings (item CH in Compustat) to total 
assets in each year during 2000–2016 ranges from 14.3 percent to 20.1 percent, and 
Table 1—Steady-State Returns
Stocks Capital Bonds
Bubbleless equilibrium  r  r + ξπ − δ  r + π − δ/ξ < 0 
Bubbly equilibrium  r  r − rξ  0 
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the sample mean is 17.5 percent. This evidence shows that US nonfinancial firms 
hold a large amount of cash with a low return and very little of other firms’ equity 
with a high return.
Some nonfinancial firms may have cross-holdings for reasons such as mergers and 
acquisitions, corporate governance, diversification, and strategic alliance. However, 
they typically do not trade other firms’ shares for regular investment financing. One 
reason is that such trading incurs large administration, filing, and monitoring costs, 
and may signal takeover interest to other firms. Such trading is risky and may lead 
to fire sales, loss of control over upstream suppliers, or competition.
If we relax Assumption 8 by allowing firms to trade each other’s shares to finance 
investment in the model of Section VE with intertemporal bonds,21 then each firm 
can earn a return  r higher than the interest rate  r ft by holding other firms’ shares. 
If there is no market friction, firms may end up holding too many shares of other 
firms and eventually overcome credit constraints. Unlimited arbitrage would cause 
the economy to attain the efficient equilibrium with  Q t = 1 and  r =  r ft in which 
no bubble could exist. Assumption 8 supports the equilibrium with  r >  r ft . This 
assumption prevents unlimited arbitrage and is justified by the empirical evidence 
discussed above (also see footnote 5).
The critical feature of Assumption 8 is not the restriction that no firm can long 
equity shares of other firms, but is the restriction that this source of finance is lim-
ited. In online Appendix G we show that, even if each firm can hold a market port-
folio of firm stocks and earn the return  r in the model of Section VE, a stock price 
bubble can still emerge and Proposition 13 still holds as long as firms do not use 
the market portfolio to finance investment due to the reasons discussed above. In 
this case the stock price bubble and the bonds can coexist with the market portfolio 
because the bubble and bonds provide a liquidity service, while the market portfolio 
does not. In equilibrium the sum of the interest rate  r ft and the liquidity premium 
 π ( Q t − 1) is equal to  r. 
VI. Conclusion
We have developed a theory of stock price bubbles in the presence of endogenous 
credit constraints in production economies with infinitely-lived agents. Bubbles 
emerge through a positive feedback loop mechanism in which credit constraints 
derived from optimal contracts with limited commitment play an essential role. Our 
analysis differs from most studies in the literature that analyze bubbles in intrinsi-
cally useless assets or in assets with exogenous payoffs in an endowment economy 
or an OLG framework. Our model can incorporate this type of bubbles and thus 
provides a unified framework to study asset bubbles. Our theory can be integrated 
into the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework and has important impli-
cations for empirical studies. First, using average Q to measure marginal Q may 
be misleading even for constant-returns-to-scale technology because they are not 
identical in the presence of stock price bubbles. Second, using the present value 
21 Cross-holdings of shares lead to the well-known problem of inflating market values (e.g., Fedenia, Hodder, 
and Triantis 1994). Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) show that the interdependence through cross-holdings of 
financial firms can generate financial contagions and cascades of failures in a static model. 
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of dividends to measure the fundamental value of a stock may also be misleading 
because dividends and bubbles cannot be separated. Third, tests based on transver-
sality conditions can rule out rational bubbles in OLG models, but not in our model.
In future research it would be interesting to study how bubbles can explain asset- 
pricing puzzles, how bubbles contribute to business cycles in a quantitative dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model (Miao, Wang, and Xu 2015), how bubbles 
affect long-run growth (Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour 2006; Martin and Ventura 
2012; Hirano and Yanagawa 2017; Miao and Wang 2014), and what the implications 
of asset price bubbles are for monetary policy (Galí 2014; Galí and Gambetti 2015).
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